We develop a nonparametric and ordinal approach for testing pure strategy Nash equilibrium play in games with monotone best responses, such as those with strategic complements/substitutes. The approach makes minimal assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity, requires no parametric assumptions on...

We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...

Counterfactual policy evaluation often requires computation of game‐theoretic equilibria. We provide new algorithms for computing pure‐strategy Nash equilibria of games on networks with finite action spaces. The algorithms exploit the fact that many agents may be endowed with types such that...

The paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show that every equilibrium is either "reciprocal" or "non-reciprocal". In a reciprocal...

We consider the dynamic network formation problem under the requirement that the whole network be connected and remain connected after q nodes are destroyed. We propose the concept of dynamic Cq-stability and characterize dynamic Cq-stable networks for any q≥0. Comparison with the outcome in...

In this paper, we propose a game in which each player decides with whom to establish a costly connection and how much local public good is provided when benefits are shared among neighbors. We show that, when agents are homogeneous, Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs....

We consider a natural generalization of Jackson and Wolinsky's (J Econ Theory 71:44- 74, 1996) connections model where the quality or strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a non-decreasing function of that amount. The information that the nodes receive...