Die Plattformökonomie entwickelt sich rasant und intensiviert den Wettbewerb. Dieser an sich positiven Entwicklung steht ein hohes Risiko der Marktabschottung durch marktbeherrschende Plattformen gegenüber. Einige Plattformunternehmen dominieren die Weltmärkte und verfügen über eine...

Die Digitalisierung führt zu einer anhaltenden Transformation des Medienökosystems. Die globale Macht von Plattformmonopolen und die zunehmende Bedeutung von künstlicher Intelligenz sind nur zwei Beispiele für die Notwendigkeit eines Updates der Medienökonomik. Wichtige Ziele sind der...

Telecom companies are a frequent target of antitrust investigations in Russia. In an industry where services tend to become more and more complex and companies actively invest in diversifying their businesses, the antitrust authority in most of its telecom cases has chosen to define markets...

This paper tends to examine the level of concentration of the banking sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main objective of the paper is to measure the level of concentration and to investigate how the concentration and type of market structure affect the prices of banking products. By...

Individual contributions by infringing firms to the compensation of cartel victims must reflect their “relative responsibility for the harm caused” according to EU legislation. Several studies have argued that the theoretically best way to operationalize this norm is to apply the Shapley...

The objective of this article is to analyze the degree of network effects in the mobile telecommunications market in Colombia, and identify other determinants of consumer choice based on a survey of uses and habits carried out by the National Consulting Center for the Commission of Regulation of...

The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) appears to be the most widely used index of market or industrial concentration. It is a summary measure that indicates the degree of competition, market power, and efficiency within a market or an industry. The HHI is also used by government agencies when...

We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but...

We assume a multistage oligopoly wherein a given number of innovators compete by selling their substitutive technologies. Each innovator sequentially and independently chooses how many licenses to sell, and subsequently, all licensees compete à la Cournot in the product market.We show that, in...