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Information aggregation in competitive markets

Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 161-196

We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information---the betweenness property---that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415617

Why are open ascending auctions popular? : the role of information aggregation and behavioral biases

Offerman, Theo; Romagnoli, Giorgia; Ziegler, Andreas - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 13 (2022) 2, pp. 787-823

The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to … activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382048

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

Manzano Tovar, Carolina; Vives, Xavier - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1095-1137

We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear‐quadratic‐normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806389

Auction theory and a note on game mechanisms

Josheski, Dushko; Karamazova, Elena - In: Croatian review of economic, business and social … 7 (2021) 1, pp. 43-59

: efficiency first and foremost, also revenue comparison between different types of auctions and the issue of incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171247

Auction design with data-driven misspecifications : inefficiency in private value auctions with correlation

Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1543-1579

We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations … about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids … the approach in second-price and first-price auctions, we establish our main result that there is no efficient auction in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135356

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

expected value conditional on winning is higher than the unconditional expectation. By contrast, standard auctions that … allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the first-price, second-price or English auctions) deliver lower revenue …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457

Trust and betrayals: reputational payoffs and behaviors without commitment

Pei, Harry - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 449-475

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587361

Relational communication

Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1391-1430

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision‐making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806596

Dynamic signaling with stochastic stakes

Gryglewicz, Sebastian; Kolb, Aaron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 539-559

We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273761