In a Ramsey policy regime, heterogeneity in beliefs about the potential costs of climate change is shown to produce policy ambiguities that alter carbon prices and taxation. Three sources of ambiguity are considered: (i) the private sector is skeptical, with beliefs that are unknown to the...

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) is a market for environmental criteria that has recently attracted the attention of policymakers and in particular European Union (EU) countries to improve environmental quality. In the context of the EU Sustainable Development Goals, this study aims...

In dynamic environments where the strategic setting evolves across time, the specific rule governing the transitions can substantially alter the incentives agents face. This is particularly true when history‐dependent strategies are used. In a laboratory study, we examine whether subjects...

We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...

In this paper we study Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) of two-player multimode differential games with controlled state dynamics, where one player controls the transition between modes. Different types of MPE are characterized distinguishing between delay equilbria, inducing for some initial...

Imposing equilibrium restrictions provides substantial gains in the estimation of dynamic discrete games. Estimation algorithms imposing these restrictions have different merits and limitations. Algorithms that guarantee local convergence typically require the approximation of high-dimensional...

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

We investigate the role and performance of imitative behavior in a class of quantity-setting, Cournot games. Within a framework of evolutionary competition between rational, myopic best-response and imitation heuristics with differential heuristics' costs, we found that the equilibrium stability...

We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes variable or to irreversibly exit the game. A...