Similar Search Results

SMEs filing for bankruptcy in Spain : the best of luck!

Sánchez-Vidal, F. Javier; García Marí, José Horacio; … - In: Business research quarterly : BRQ 28 (2025) 1, pp. 141-163

The aim of this work is to analyze the factors that help companies avoid liquidation following the spirit of the Spanish insolvency law. This work focuses on the phase starting when companies file for bankruptcy and ending with the completion of the common phase. We apply the agency theory to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015372943

The role of corporate governance in managing small income in Indonesian state-owned enterprise

Nurhayati, Puji; Hatmawan, Aglis Andhita - In: Financial studies 25 (2021) 1, pp. 78-94

occurringso as to reduce earnings management is corporate governance. It aims to determine manager accountability through existing … asymmetry on earnings management through the role of corporate governance in State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) in Indonesia. The … importance of corporate governance to build reputation and strength on SOEs in Indonesia.corporate governance to build reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012664505

The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation

D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397

We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) and the interviewers it hired...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372

Escalation of commitment and CEO departures : theory and evidence

Chulkov, Dmitriy V.; Barron, John M. - In: Journal of business economics and management 22 (2021) 6, pp. 1416-1435

The escalation of commitment process involves a decision-maker continuing commitment to an investment after receiving negative information. This study develops a principal-agent model to explore how escalation decisions are linked with departures of CEOs from the position.  With asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013257237

The use of the principle of sharing and mutuality in covering risks (in the modern world)

Łyskawa, Krzysztof; Janowicz-Lomott, Marietta - In: International journal of business and economic sciences … 15 (2022) 2, pp. 1-15

Purpose: Operational risks appear as the main threats of the modern world. Mistakes made by employees, an imperfect information systems or changes in the law can cause losses that businesses today are not even able to estimate. Therefore, in the face of widespread the asymmetry of information,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013489498

Accounting information quality moderates the effect of dividends on investment decisions : evidence in Vietnam

Quoc Trung Nguyen Kim - In: Cogent economics & finance 11 (2023) 2, pp. 1-13

The author specifies the pivotal role of accounting information quality in moderating the influence of dividends on the investment decisions of listed firms in Vietnam from 2009 to 2020. In this study, the significant dependence of investment on dividends is proved by the Two-Step System...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014503130

Delegating learning

Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421

Mechanism design with financially constrained agents and costly verification

Li, Yunan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 1139-1194

A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget‐constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare‐maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two‐stage scheme. First, agents report...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806402

Payoff implications of incentive contracting

Garrett, Daniel F. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1281-1312

In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806477

Monitoring experts

Azrieli, Yaron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1313-1350

We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806483