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better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049
aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they … activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed … and in the potential activation of behavioral biases: (i) the ascending Vickrey auction, a closed format; and two open …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382048
I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long‐lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415277
rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and … dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806306
' WTP using a non-hypothetical experimental auction for 'blood orange' [known as Arancia Rossa di Sicilia PGI (Protected …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053891
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415617
We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806389
This paper will review important topics on the subject of auction theory and mechanism design, these include … tells us that if buyers and sellers both have private information full efficiency is impossible, however Vickrey auction … (single unit auction) will be efficient i.e. will put the goods in the hands of the buyers that value them most. However, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171247
the approach in second-price and first-price auctions, we establish our main result that there is no efficient auction in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135356
that differ in the elicitation technique: secondprice Vickrey auction and discrete choice experiment. For each technique … benefits of policy interventions. The paper reports the results of an experiment that combines induced value and home …-grown value elicitation procedures. Home-grown values are elicited for a public food policy. The experiment has two treatments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012263861