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optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620
. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440091
We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468074
Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779
multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output … likelihood ratio property, the mechanism offers a single debt contract. Our results generalize if the output distribution is … “close” to multiplicatively separable. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327130
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009726270
, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372
contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
This paper is the first (to our knowledge) to analytically model the optimal contracting for a member of the board of directors who holds multiple directorships. Prior literature has found conflicting evidence on the overall effect of multiple directorships on shareholder welfare: busy board...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273012
We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria which are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive-effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635277