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Guards vs vigilantes : the effect of rule enforcement strategies on sustainable use norms in common property regimes

Breen, Trevor; Tavoni, Alessandro - 2020

This paper uses replicator dynamics to compare the steady states arising from two types of common property regimes - one in which over-exploiters are punished by the resource users themselves, and another where enforcement is handled by guards who collect a tax from the users. The use of guards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012392491

Punishment strategies across societies : conventional wisdoms reconsidered

Suleiman, Ramzi; Samid, Yuval - In: Games 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1-23

reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the …Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes … cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607461

Sustained cooperation in a public good game : evidence from Guyana

Cartwright, Edward; Singh, Thomas - 2024

in Europe, North America and Asia. There is little evidence from South and Central America. In an experiment conducted in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015399347

Evolution of "pay-it-forward" in the presence of the temptation to free-ride

Uchida, Satoshi; Sasaki, Tatsuya; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; … - In: Games 15 (2024) 3, pp. 1-15

Paying it forward" is a behavior in which people help someone else because they were helped in the past. Although experimental evidence exists that indicates that real human beings often "pay-it-forward" even in the face of free-rider risks, the theoretical basis for the evolution of this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636252

Self-governance in generalized exchange. a laboratory experiment on the structural embeddedness of peer punishment

Kanitsar, Georg - In: Games 12 (2021) 2, pp. 1-16

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However …, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in … another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012547824

The intuition of punishment : a study of fairness preferences and cognitive ability

Seier, Markus - In: Games 11 (2020) 2/21, pp. 1-25

and a third-party punishment task. Subjects afterwards completed the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test. Results showed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431890

Fractional punishment of free riders to improve cooperation in optional public good games

Botta, Rocio; Blanco, Gerardo; Schaerer, Christian E. - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/17, pp. 1-21

Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432605

The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines : laboratory evidence

Caffera, Marcelo; Chávez Rebolledo, Carlos; Ardente, … - 2021

Using experiments in which participants play the role of polluting firms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits under two types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We find that the market price of pollution permits and the probability of violating permits holdings are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013174118

Optimal contest design when policing damaging behavior

Gilpatric, Scott M.; Hong, Ye - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-22

We consider the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only productive efforts, but also some damaging aggressive behavior by contestants. The organizer must choose prizes and an enforcement regime defined as a limit on how much aggressiveness will be tolerated and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426263

The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 : tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis

Zhou, Yuxun; Rahman, Mohammad Mafizur; Khanam, Rashida; … - In: Operations research perspectives 9 (2022), pp. 1-16

Purpose - Based on the fact that punishment and subsidy mechanisms affect the anti-epidemic incentives of major … subsidy mechanism will raise the government expenditure. The punishment mechanism is more effective than the subsidy mechanism … in realizing the tripartite joint prevention of the COVID-19. Therefore, the implementation of strict punishment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014245489