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Ripperger-Suhler, Daniel - In: Games 15 (2024) 2, pp. 1-38

A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014636236

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent

Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 715-761

optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620

The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation

D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397

, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372

(Bad) reputation in relational contracting

Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800

Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779

Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation

Bhaskar, V.; Olszewski, Wojciech; Wiseman, Thomas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 1027-1055

We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria which are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive-effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635277

Agency theory meets matching theory

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, J. David - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 1-33

affect the optimal incentive contract. Finally, we discuss the effect of the existence of moral hazard on the nature of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503888

Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard

Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1357-1401

multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output … likelihood ratio property, the mechanism offers a single debt contract. Our results generalize if the output distribution is … “close” to multiplicatively separable. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327130

Contracting over persistent information

Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 917-974

We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal's preferred action. We show that there exists an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576723

Heterogeneity in decentralized asset markets

Hugonnier, Julien; Lester, Benjamin; Weill, Pierre-Olivier - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1313-1356

We study a canonical model of decentralized exchange for a durable good or asset, where agents are assumed to have time-varying, heterogeneous utility types. Whereas the existing literature has focused on the special case of two types, we allow agents' utility to be drawn from an arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327129