We argue that owing to traders' inability to fully express their preferences over the execution times of their orders, contemporary stock market designs are prone to latency arbitrage. In turn, we propose a new order type, which allows traders to specify the time at which their orders are...

We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism-a popular school choice mechanism that is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient...

Modern information technologies make it possible to store, analyze, and trade unprecedented amounts of detailed information about individuals. This has led to public discussions on whether individuals' privacy should be better protected by restricting the amount or the precision of information...

We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last...

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

To study coordination in complex social systems such as financial markets, the authors introduce a new prediction market set-up that accounts for fundamental uncertainty. Nonetheless, the market is designed so that its total value is known, and thus its rationality can be evaluated. In two...

This paper provides the first steps towards a theoretical and structural modelling framework through which optimal decision making in financial market infrastructures such as payments clearing and settlement systems can be assessed from a market microstructure perspective. In particular, the...

This study investigates efficient and strategy‐proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is...

In the allocation of indivisible objects under weak priorities, a common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose and study the concept of ex-ante fairness for...