Dictators, even those who seize power with the intention of helping the nation, frequently morph over time into tyrants. There may be many reasons for this. This paper focuses on one interesting and arguably pervasive driver behind this process. A model is developed which shows that the series...

This study investigates the dynamics of a stochastic hyperbolic discounting model in a continuous-time framework to address the complexities associated with the corporate international investment consumption problem (CIICP). By formulating a dynamic programming equation based on the principles...

In this paper, we study intertemporal social welfare evaluations when agents have heterogeneous preferences that are interpersonally noncomparable. We first show that even if all agents share the same preferences, there is a conflict between the axioms of Pareto principle, time consistency, and...

This paper investigates the effects of members' exits from a currency union on the credibility of the common currency. In our currency union model, the inflation rate of the common currency is determined by majority voting among N member countries that are heterogeneous with respect to their...

Considering that the assumption of time consistency does not adequately reveal the mechanisms of exit decisions of venture capital (VC), this study proposes two kinds of time-inconsistent preferences (i.e., time-flow inconsistency and time-point inconsistency) to advance research in this field....

In the present paper, we investigate the Merton portfolio management problem in the context of non-exponential discounting, a context that gives rise to time-inconsistency of the decision-maker. We consider equilibrium policies within the class of open-loop controls that are characterized, in...

In recent years, several high-profile incidents have spurred research into games of timing. A framework emanating from the FlipIt model features two covert agents competing to control a single contested resource. In its basic form, the resource exists forever while generating value at a constant...

The commitment ability of governments is neither infinite nor zero but intermediate. In this paper, we determine the commitment ability that a government needs to implement a unique equilibrium outcome and rule out self-fulfilling expectations. We show that, in a large class of static...

The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players' present-bias will affect bargaining outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in...