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On the safety of group manipulation

Peters, Hans; Veselova, Yuliya - In: Social choice and welfare 61 (2023) 3, pp. 713-732

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014382248

Quantity, quality, equality : introducing a new measure of social welfare

Enflo, Karin - In: Social choice and welfare 57 (2021) 3, pp. 665-701

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012622692

On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

Bergantiños, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. - In: Social choice and welfare 58 (2022) 2, pp. 321-347

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819636

Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty

Narayanan, Aroon - In: Social choice and welfare 60 (2023) 4, pp. 561-578

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014253578

Choice resolutions

Cantone, Domenico; Giarlotta, Alfio; Watson, Stephen - In: Social choice and welfare 56 (2021) 4, pp. 713-753

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012586271

Optimizing voting order on sequential juries : a median voter theorem and beyond

Alpern, Steve; Chen, Bo - In: Social choice and welfare 58 (2022) 3, pp. 527-565

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197667

The problem of no hands : responsibility voids in collective decisions

Duijf, Hein; Putte, Frederik van de - In: Social choice and welfare 58 (2022) 4, pp. 753-790

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197681

The doctrinal paradox : comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework

Alabert, Aureli; Farré, Mercè - In: Social choice and welfare 58 (2022) 4, pp. 863-895

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197689

Roberts' weak welfarism theorem : a minor correction

Hammond, Peter J. - In: Social choice and welfare 60 (2023) 1/2, pp. 121-134

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226060

Voting behavior under outside pressure : promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

Bolle, Friedel; Otto, Philipp E. - In: Social choice and welfare 58 (2022) 4, pp. 711-740

When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with a simple equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197678