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Strategic communication with reporting costs
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419188
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Strategic communication with reporting costs
Fluet, Claude; Emons, Winand - 2016
constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our … parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Typically, they never reveal all information. A …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419483
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Non-comparative versus comparative advertising as a quality signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2011 - Version: February 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009356236
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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Fluet, Claude; Emons, Winand - 2010
evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At quilibrium the two parties never testify together …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198890
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Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs
Emons, Winand - 2020
constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart from this literature by introducing a cost to communicate. Our … parties trade off their reporting cost against the effect on the decision. Typically, they never reveal all information. A …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855755
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Adversarial Versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2020
evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178338
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Non-Comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
Emons, Winand - 2012
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: In the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111237
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Non-Comparative Versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
Emons, Winand - 2012
Two firms produce a good with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic called quality. The difference in the unobservable quality levels determines how the firms share the market. We consider two scenarios: in the first one, firms disclose quality; in the second one, they send costly signals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113303
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Accuracy versus Falsification Costs : The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - 2007
conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low … cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014052799