We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification that predicts strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and allows us to relate...

We study the effectiveness of emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol with respect to reducing CO₂ emissions. Using country-level and US state-level panel data and employing the synthetic control method, we find very little evidence for an emission reduction effect for the major emitters among...

Many poor countries are ill-adapted to the current leave alone a changing future climate, because they lack the necessary financial means to invest in efficient and costeffective safeguarding measures. International endeavours to fund institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, to provide...

Many poor countries are ill-adapted to the current leave alone a changing future climate, because they lack the necessary financial means to invest in efficient and cost-effective safeguarding measures. International endeavours to fund institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, to provide...

We examine long-run treaties for mitigating climate change. Countries pay an initial fee into a global fund that is invested in long-run assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the participating countries in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved in this...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...

We examine a global refunding scheme for mitigating climate change. Countries pay an initial fee into a global fund that is invested in long-run assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the participating countries in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved in...

We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in identical countries first decide whether to join an international environmental agreement (IEA), then delegate the domestic emission choices to an agent. Finally, agents in all countries...

We examine long-run treaties for mitigating climate change. Countries pay an initial fee into a global fund that is invested in long-run assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the participating countries in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved in this...