This paper views financial intermediaries as vertically integrated firms. The authors explore how competitive conditions in retail and wholesale funding markets affect the incentive for (upstream) originators and (downstream) fund managers to integrate. The underlying tradeoff in our model is...

We find that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without financial covenants--so-called covenant-lite loans--borrowing firms' revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional financial covenants. This...

This is the Online Appendix to accompany “Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates” by Mitchell Berlin, Greg Nini, and Edison Yu. It includes material that we deem as supplementary to the primary analysis included in the main document

We find that corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. Despite the rise in term loans without financial covenants—so-called covenant-lite loans—borrowing firms' revolving lines of credit almost always retain traditional financial covenants. This...

Corporate loan contracts frequently concentrate control rights with a subset of lenders. In a large fraction of leveraged loans, which typically include a revolving line of credit and a term loan, the revolving lenders have the exclusive right and ability to monitor and renegotiate the financial...