This paper discusses the formation of organizational knowledge of boundedly rational Economic agents and studies the necessity of hierarchical coordination of economic agents. We consider a firm that consists of a management and N subordinated shops....

When members of an organization share communication codes, coordination across subunits is easier. But if groups interact separately, they will each develop a specialized code. This paper asks: Can organizations shape how people interact in order to create shared communication codes? What kinds...

Using a laboratory experiment, we examine whether informal monetary sanctions can lead to better coordination in a repeated minimum effort coordination game. While most groups first experience inefficient coordination, the efficiency increases substantially after introducing an ex post...

This paper considers a model of economic network characterized by an endogenous architecture and frictions in the relations among agents as described in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network model with the difference that frictions in the relations among agents are endogenous....

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address...

Considering the degree of political and economic integration in Europe, trade unions can no longer stick to purely national strategies. Since the 1980s the key political projects of European integration have played a major role to force the neoliberal reorganisation of European capitalism...

In case of multiple source lending even solvent firms may be forced into bankruptcy due to uncoordinated credit withdrawals of their lenders. This paper analyzes whether a debtor firm can thwart such inefficient liquidations by offering creditors the option to delay their foreclosure decision...