We present a comprehensive theory of large non-anonymous games in which agents have a name and a determinate social-type and/or biological trait to resolve the dissonance of a (matching-pennies type) game with an exact pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with finite agents, but without one when...

We present proofs, based on the Shapley-Folkman theorem, of the convexity of the range of a strongly continuous, finitely additive easure, as well as that of an atomless, countably additive measure. We also present proofs, based on diagonalization and separation arguments respectively, of the...

This paper offers a sufficient condition, based on Maharam (1942) and re-emphasized by Hoover-Keisler (1984), for the validity of Lyapunov's (1940) theorem on the range of an atomless vector measure taking values in an infinite-dimensional Banach space that is not necessarily separable nor has...