Negotiations between a country in default and its international creditors are modeled as a dynamic game in an environment of weak contractual enforcement. The country cannot borrow internationally until it settles with all creditors. Delay arises in equilibrium as creditors engage in strategic...

Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold-up a set- tlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory...

We consider a setting in which the buyer's ability to hold up a seller's investment is so severe that there is no investment in equilibrium of the static game typically analyzed. We show that there exists an equilibrium of a dynamic game generating positive investment. The seller makes a...

We examine a problem with n players each facing the same binary choice. One choice is superior to the other. The simple assumption of competition - that an individual's payoff falls with a rise in the number of players making the same choice, guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric...

This paper distinguishes between the hypothesis that the Victorian government developed a reputation for easy renewal of timber rights, so that the lack of clearly defined site sizes and the short-term nature of these rights did not matter, and the hypothesis that tenure and site size as written...

We develop a theory that explains the difference between public and private ownership for the case of firms that are well approximated by an owner\managed or closely held form of firm. The theory is based on government monitoring and control of actions that potentially allow managersto divert...