In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a “two-tier equilibrium” in which “reputable” auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for...

It is shown that if there is adverse selection on seller’s ability in experience goods market, credible communication can be sustained by reputation motives in spite of the inherent conflict of interests between sellers and buyers. In the absence of “commitment” types, reputation motives...

We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated - the quid pro quo motive - or from the...

In the "glass ceiling" debate there appear to be two strongly held and opposing interpretations of the evidence, one suggesting it is really the result of gender differences and the other that there is discrimination by gender. This paper provides an economic theory of the glass ceiling and one...