We analyze the contractual relation between workers and their employers when there is nominal risk. The key feature of the problem is that the consumption deflator is random and observed sometime after the effort is exerted. The worker's effort is not observable, and to induce the agent to work,...

We analyze the contractual relation between workers and their employers when there is nominal risk. The key feature of the problem is that the consumption deflator is random and observed sometime after the effort is exerted. The worker's effort is not observable, and to induce the agent to work,...

Entrants are typically found to be more innovative than incumbent firms. Furthermore, these innovative ideas often originate with established firms in the industry. Therefore, the established firm and the start-up firm seem to select different types of projects. We claim that this is the...

Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To answer this question, I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectual property rights are not well protected. The upside of VC financing is that the VC understands the business better than a bank....

This paper argues that a large technological innovation may lead to a merger wave by inducing entrepreneurs to seek funds from technologically knowledgeable firms -experts. When a large technological innovation occurs, the ability of non-experts (banks) to discriminate between good and bad...

No abstract.

This paper develops a model of R&D with firms' life-cycles. When a young firm creates new knowledge, the firm may hesitate to implement the knowledge because it is hard to predict if the implementation will be successful. Nevertheless, once the firm implements the knowledge successfully (and...

We study the matching problem between firms and CEOs, extending a popular version of the principal-agent model developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). In their model, the optimal pay-performance sensitivity decreases in firm risks and agent's risk aversion, and increases in agent's...

Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To answer this question, I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectual property rights are not well protected. The upside of VC financing is that the VC understands the business better than a bank....

Evidence suggests that young firm acquisitions have outgrown both IPOs and established firm acquisitions. To study this phenomenon, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model of mergers and acquisitions as efficient reallocation of assets. A firm may build assets that it may not be able to manage...