Showing 1 - 10 of 84
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001774925
This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to aliated private value and common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in U.S. federal government o.shore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that e.cient collusion is always possible in private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002200407
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002183438
This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1959 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175755
This paper describes an ongoing research project, in which we examine recent trends in bidding for offshore oil and gas leases, and the exploration and development of leases after they are sold. We review empirical findings regarding bidder participation and bidding for the period 1954 through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199878
This paper extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments, and applies the theory to explain joint bidding patterns in U.S. federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227485
This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244730
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950330
We review the issues involved in designing a mechanism for allocating resource rights. We focus on the case of exploration and development rights for oil and gas leases in U.S. federal lands to highlight the tradeoffs at play. The main issues concern the design of the lease contract, the design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010233153
We describe the economics literature on auction markets, with an emphasis on the connection between theory, empirical practice, and public policy, and a discussion of outstanding issues. We describe some basic concepts, to highlight some strengths and weaknesses of the literature, and so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003742927