This article explores whether cartelists should be liable for losses resulting from umbrella pricing, thereby critically evaluating the ECJ's judgment in “Kone”. Since the EU legislature did not resolve the question of liability for umbrella pricing, it has to be evaluated in accordance with...

Although much has been written about RPM and Exclusive Dealing, acting alone, scant attention has been paid to the welfare outcome when the 2 restraints are imposed together. The article examines 2 such cases. Salton's George Foreman Contact Grills and ordinary incandescent light bulbs. It shows...

In this Article we focus upon an area in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress competition. Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other jurisdictions have taken strong...

We formulate two empirical tests for collusive behavior based on the theoretical insights of Werden and Froeb [1994] and Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico [2004]. The first predicts that colluding firms will reduce pair-wise differences in prices within a market if demand satisfies certain...

We study cartels that operated in the US generic drug industry, leveraging quarterly Medicaid data from 2011-2018 and a difference-in-differences approach comparing the evolution of prices of allegedly collusive drugs with a group of competitive control drugs. Our analysis highlights (i) the...

The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent...

A judicial review of the infringement decisions of the competition authority substantially affects the standard of evidence in competition enforcement as well as the structure of cases that the competition authority takes. Enforcement against concerted practice in Russia represents a case-study...

After arguing that collusion by software programs which choose pricing rules without any human intervention is not in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the paper offers a path towards making collusion by autonomous agents unlawful

We analyze maximal cartel prices in infinitely-repeated oligopoly models under leniency where fines are linked to illegal gains, as often outlined in existing antitrust regulation, and detection probabilities depend on the degree of collusion. We introduce cartel culture that describes how...