"Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and...

"Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and...

We develop a model of electoral competition in which citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates; a winner implements her favorite policy. The equilibrium number of candidates depends negatively on the cost of run ning and positively on the benets of winning. For some parameter values...

The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is described. Strategic game, Bayesian games, extensive games with perfect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium,...

We study interactive situations in which players are boundedly ra- tional. Each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior. as in the theory of Nash equilibrium, uses the following choice procedure. She first associates one consequence with each of her...

We study party formation in a general model of collective decisionmaking, modeling parties as agglomerations of policy positions championed by decision-makers. We show that if there are economies of party size and the policy chosen is not beaten by another policy in pairwise voting, then players...

We find all the mixed strategy equilibria, within a certain class, of the simplified three-firm location model of Hotelling (in which the price variable is ignored).

I first show that if there are more than two potential candidates in the Hotelling- Downs model of the simultaneous choice of positions by politicians then an equilibrium fails to exist in a wide range of situations. Subsequently I study a temporal model in which candidates are free to act...

We study the implications of economies of party size in a model of party formation. We show that when the policy space is one-dimensional, candidates form at most two parties. This result does not depend on the magnitude of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the...

We consider a planner who chooses between two possible public policies and ask whether a referendum or a cost benefit analysis leads to higher welfare. We find that a referendum leads to higher welfare than a cost benefit analyses in "common value" environments. Cost benefit analysis is better...