We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the...

I define a restricted version of Nash's Independence that overcomes its major criticisms and then show that a one parameter class of asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions is characterized by Restricted Independence, Scale Invariance, Pareto Optimality and Kalai and Smorodinsky's Individual...

In a standard search model I relax the assumption that agents know the distribution of offers and characterize the behavioral and welfare consequences of overconfidence. Optimistic individuals search longer than pessimists if they are equally "stubborn" and high offers are good news. Otherwise,...

Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private information to the profits of bidders. However, the theory has failed to consider the question of whether or not bidders will be able to keep their information private. We show that in a variety of contexts bidders will reveal all their...

Policemen are known to support colleagues who are the subject of criminal investigations. While we might expect guilty officers to defend each other, why do law-abiding policemen defend those who have broken the law? We investigate under what conditions it is in the interest of a group to defend...

We study the logic of Peronist interventionist polices and the beliefs that support them. Instead of a comprehensive approach, we focus on three elements. First, we study beliefs and values about the economic system present in Peron's speeches during the period 1943-55. Second, we study survey...

We describe the evolution of selective aspects of punishment in the US over the period 1980-2004. We note that imprisonment increased around 1980, a period that coincides with the "Reagan revolution" in economic matters. We build an economic model where beliefs about economic opportunities and...

We propose a model where voters experience an emotional cost when they observe a firm that has displayed insufficient concern for other people's welfare (altruism) in the process of making high profits. Even with few truly altruistic firms, an equilibrium may emerge where all firms pretend to be...