Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage brokers charged higher percentage fees for loans that turned out to be riskier ex post, even when conditioning on other risk characteristics. High conditional fees reveal borrower attributes that are associated with high borrower risk, such as suboptimal...

Is liquidity better when a trade counterparty's brokerage firm is unknown (anonymous) or known (transparent)? We examine a quasi-natural experiment where some firms switched from transparent to anonymous trading and then, one year later, switched back. Our results for inside spread, price...

We develop an equilibrium model for origination fees charged by mortgage brokers and show how the equilibrium fee distribution depends on borrowers' valuation for their loans and their information about fees. We use non-crossing quantile regressions and data from a large subprime lender to...

Anonymous trading is the norm in today's financial markets but there are a few exceptions. We study one such case, the OMX Nordic Exchanges (Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Reykjavik) that have traditionally been more transparent than most other markets. On June 2, 2008 OMX Nordic switched...

We develop an equilibrium model for origination fees charged by mortgage brokers and show how the equilibrium fee distribution depends on borrowers' valuation for their loans and their information about fees. We use non-crossing quantile regressions and data from a large subprime lender to...

We report evidence that the presence of hidden liquidity is associated with greater liquidity in the order books, greater trading volume, and smaller price impact. Limit and market order submission behavior changes when hidden liquidity is present consistent with at least some traders being able...