Showing 1 - 10 of 18
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the information about the true state of the world and (ii) a second opinion/interim news after the initial consultation with the expert. In this model, the principal's action as well as the expert's message...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015224552
We develop a reputational cheap talk model where the principal can cancel an action initially started on the advice of an expert if she gets an unfavorable interim news. But if the status quo is reinstated, the principal is unable to verify the true state of the world. In the model, experts want...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015230176
We introduce bureaucratic corruption in a simple way and examine its effect on government revenue when policies change. We show that a rise in the tax rate can lead to a fall in net revenue--a Laffer curve result due to the proportion of auditors that are corrupt and enforcement costs. It may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334358
The paper uses firm level panel data for Indian industries in the post-reform period to study the direct and indirect productivity effects generated by foreign investment. It finds no evidence that foreign investment directly increased firm-level productivity, nor that R&D spending was more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010911575
We examine the most likely strategy of product differentiation by newly entering multinational firms when market reforms begin in a developing economy. We argue that incumbents in a non contestable protected market do not have the usual advantages of an incumbent as in a standard sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005055571
The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services in third world countries. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision, and secondly, by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572156
Suppose an agent is contemplating an action with state-contingent payoffs, and has a prior belief about the probability of the states. She hires an expert to update her priors before the action. Experts may be both informed as well as uninformed, and are not necessarily truthful. The question...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130238
Literature presumes that exporters from small countries and particularly of primary products do not practice pricing-to-market (PTM) because of lack of market power. Out paper examines New Zealand’s pastoral exports over 1988-2002 and finds strong evidence of PTM. Evidence rejects the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005256591
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the information about the true state of the world and (ii) a second opinion/interim news after the initial consultation with the expert. In this model, the principal's action as well as the expert's message...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008756479
We augment the standard career concerns model by introducing (i) an action that blocks the information about the true state of the world and (ii) the possibility that the principal might reverse her initial action after receiving an interim news. In this model, the principal's decisions as well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788554