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We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014174095
This paper investigates the impacts of progressive trade openness, technological externalities, and heterogeneity of individuals on the formation of entrepreneurship in a two-country occupation choice model. We show that trade opening gives rise to a non-monotonic process of international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222967
We study a strict version of the notion of equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (1997) that allows for a larger class of incomplete information perturbations of a given complete information game, where with high probability, players believe that their payoffs are close to (but may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014358685
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003964822
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002174859
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700407
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673541
This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3x3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124968
This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063048
We present a multi-regional endogenous growth model in which forward-looking agents choose their regions to live in, in addition to consumption and capital accumulation paths. The spatial distribution of economic activity is determined by the interplay between production spillover effects and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850797