This paper is concerned with confidentiality of vertical information sharing in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer in the upstream and two or more retailers in the downstream engaging in a Bertrand competition. Each retailer has some private information about the uncertain demand and...

A firm hires a consultant to acquire demand information. The outcome of information acquisition may turn out to be successful such that the firm becomes informed of the market demand, or unsuccessful such that it remains uninformed. After the outcome becomes clear, the firm learns its...

We study both theoretically and experimentally the decisions players make in two queueing games with batch service. In both games, players are asked to independently decide when to join a discrete-time queue to receive service, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. Equilibrium...

Business organizations are faced with the financial and physical task of managing interrelated flows of material and cash. Material needs capital, and on the other hand, when finished goods are sold, they contribute to cash reserves. In this paper, we present and study a dynamic model in which...

The extant research on supply chain information sharing under wholesale pricing often assumes a model where the manufacturer can unilaterally set any wholesale price, and the retailer decides retail quantity or price while taking the wholesale price as given. Whereas this model may actually...

We study information dissemination in an online platform where multiple sellers distribute their partially substitutable products. The platform has superior information about consumer demand and determines whether, and with how many sellers, to share the information. An important feature of our...

This paper examines the incentives for firms to share information vertically in a two-level supply chain in which there are one upstream firm, a manufacturer, and many downstream firms, retailers. The retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition and are endowed with some private information....

This paper examines the incentives for firms to share information vertically in a two-level supply chain in which there are one upstream firm, a manufacturer, and many downstream firms, retailers. The retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition and are endowed with some private information....