We present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differental game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tarifff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies...

In this paper, we complement the work of Kemp and Shimomura (2002) by considering the case of many donors playing a dynamic non-cooperative game of foreign aid. We consider two models. Model 1 deals with the case where donor countries continually feel the warm glow of from the act of giving....

Oil companies often announce revised estimates of their reserves. This indicates that stock uncertainty is a prevalent feature of natural resource industries. In this paper we consider the multi-deposit case where resource extraction produces information about the size of reserves. We show that...

A collection of essays on contemporary international trade, this text critiques the major theoretical components; including the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage and the developed normative analysis of international transfers

We develop a model of international trade with increasing returns to scale by taking into account the possibility of cooperation among agents in an egalitarian economy. It is shown that each country gains from trade in a trading world in which there are arbitrary numbers of...

The Frankel-Romer-Lucas theory of endogenous growth rests on the assumption of knowledge-based externalities and price-taking representative households. It is argued that, in a context of long-run growth, these assumptions are mutually incompatible (that representative households will co-operate...

We develop a model of international trade with increasing returns to scale by taking into account the possibility of cooperation among agents in an egalitarian economy. It is shown that each country gains from trade in a trading world in which there are arbitrary numbers of...