We present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differental game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tarifff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies...

In this paper, we complement the work of Kemp and Shimomura (2002) by considering the case of many donors playing a dynamic non-cooperative game of foreign aid. We consider two models. Model 1 deals with the case where donor countries continually feel the warm glow of from the act of giving....

Oil companies often announce revised estimates of their reserves. This indicates that stock uncertainty is a prevalent feature of natural resource industries. In this paper we consider the multi-deposit case where resource extraction produces information about the size of reserves. We show that...

A collection of essays on contemporary international trade, this text critiques the major theoretical components; including the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage and the developed normative analysis of international transfers

Assuming identical firms, a linear market demand function and a single factor of production, labour, we analyse the existence and stability of a homogeneous Cournot duopoly facing imperfect competition in both product and factor markets. Under the assumption of a fairly general wage function we...

Cournot oligopoly has been studied almost exclusively under the implicit assumption of perfectly competitive factor markets. However,oligopolistic firms procure often factors of production from imperfectly competitive markets. Okuguchi(1998,2000) has analyzed Cournot oligopoly under the...

Assuming identical firms, a linear market demand function and a single factor of production, labour, we analyse the existence and stability of a homogeneous Cournot duopoly facing imperfect competition in both product and factor markets. Under the assumption of a fairly general wage function we...

We develop a model of international trade with increasing returns to scale by taking into account the possibility of cooperation among agents in an egalitarian economy. It is shown that each country gains from trade in a trading world in which there are arbitrary numbers of...