We study dynamic network games with two types of players (i.e., heterogeneous players) characterized by their different intrinsic preferences. Instead of calculating the Nash equilibrium, we focus on the asymptotic behavior of an asynchronous best response dynamics. We develop a dynamic approach...

The replicator equation model for the evolution of individual behaviors in a single-species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space is developed as a dynamics on the set of probability measures. Stability of monomorphisms in this model using the weak topology is compared to more...

Individuals repeatedly face a multi-decision task with unknown payoff distributions. They have minimal memory and update their strategy by observing previous play (and not strategy) of someone else. We select behavior rules that increase average payoffs as often as possible in a large population...

The effect that exogenous mistakes, made by players choosing their strategies, have on the dynamic stability for the replicator dynamic is analyzed for both asymmetric and symmetric normal form games. Through these perturbed games, the dynamic solution concept of limit asymptotic stability is...

The analysis of the replicator dynamic in generic perfect information games yields the following results. In the long run, players play a Nash equilibrium provided that initially all strategies are present. There is at most one ``stable'' component (formally, an interior asymptotically stable...

The evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in generic finite extensive-form games with perfect information is examined. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare mutations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each...

The replicator equation model for the evolution of individual behaviors in a single-species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space is developed as a dynamics on the set of probability measures. Stability of monomorphisms in this model using the weak topology is compared to more...

We fix the status quo (Q) and one of the bilateral bargaining agents to examine how shifting the opponent.s ideal point (type) away from Q in a unidimensional space affects the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions when opponents differ only in their ideal points. The results are...