Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future, since inspections can be influenced by firms' past performance relative to other competitors in the...

We analyze the strategic decision of firms to voluntarily certify corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in a context where other firms can falsely pretend to be socially responsible. Equilibrium outcomes are crucially determined by consumers' beliefs about the credibility of firms' CSR...

We investigate the features of optimal regulatory policies composed of pollution standards and probabilities of inspection, where fines for non-compliance depend not only on the degree of violation but also on non-gravity factors. We show that optimal policies can induce either compliance or...

We study optimal policies composed of pollution standards, probabilities of inspection and fines dependant on the degree of noncompliance with the standards, in a context where regulated firms own private information. In contrast with previous literature, we show that optimal policies, being...

To facilitate the energy transition, regulators can choose between several policy options to stimulate energy-efficient design by firms. One possibility is to target firms directly through standards or subsidies. Alternatively, it is possible to influence firms indirectly by targeting firms'...

Many conservation programs offer financialcompensation to farmers in exchange for socially desiredservices, such as soil conservation or biodiversity protection.Realization of the conservation objective at minimum costrequires payments to just cover the extra costs incurred byeach individual...

We investigate the features of optimal regulatory policies composed of pollution standards and probabilities of inspection, where fines for non-compliance depend not only on the degree of violation but alson on nongravity factors.We show that optimal policies can induce either compliance or...

We study optimal policies composed of pollution standards, probabilities of inspection and fines dependant on the degree of noncompliance with the standards, in a context where regulated firms own private information.In contrast with previous literature, we show that optimal policies, being...