We propose a model of religious organizations which relies on the ability of such organizations and personal utility shocks. We show how religious organizations arise endogenously and characterize their features. Specifically, we find that members of the religious organization share similar...

This paper analyzes whether political outcomes in local democracies are determined by the preferences of the median - typically poor - agents or whether they reflect the wishes of the wealthy elites. A model shows that when politicians belonging to different groups can form coalitions, the...

We propose a model of religious organizations which relies on the ability of such organizations to affect individual beliefs about the causality between actions in the social context and personal utility shocks. We show how religious organizations arise endogenously and characterize their...

This paper examines how preference heterogeneity affects the ability of the poor to extract resources from the rich. We study the equilibrium of a game in which coalitions of individuals form parties, parties propose platforms, and all individuals vote, with the winning policy chosen by...