Showing 1 - 10 of 15
We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746240
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009461937
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274852
Verwendung von Anreizverträgen für Politiker. Klassifizierung von Politikern in Staatsmänner und Populisten.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009476217
As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politicians may pander to public opinion. To solve this problem, we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753121
We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753178
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833887
We examine the interaction between vote-share contracts and learning-by-doing. Candidates for a political office are allowed to offer vote-share thresholds. The elected politician has to achieve at least this threshold value in his reelection result to remain in office for a second term. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206302
Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009663
Dieses Buch ist eine Open-Access-Publikation unter einer CC BY-NC 2.5 Lizenz. Der Band vereint Beiträge aus dem Graduiertenkolleg „Nachhaltigkeit in Umwelt, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft“ an der Katholischen Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. Der Begriff der Nachhaltigkeit wird aus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011711150