We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market....

We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor's pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behavior-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and...

We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to uniform pricing while the competitor's pricing policy is left unconstrained. The asymmetric no-discrimination constraint prohibits both behavior-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and...

We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market....

Competing firms often have the possibility to jointly determine the magnitude of consumers' switching costs. Examples include compatibility decisions and the option of introducing number portability in telecom and banking. We put forward a model where firms jointly decide to reduce switching...

There is much debate on how the flow of information between firms should be organized, and whether existing privacy laws should be amended. We offer a welfare comparison of the three main current policies towards consumer privacy - anonymity, opt in, and opt out - within a two-period model of...