This study aims to examine urban zoning within a linear city in a Bertrand duopolistic competition framework with price discrimination and linear transportation costs. It analyses the effects of introducing an environmental area where economic and residential activity are not allowed. The...

This article depicts a location game in a circular market. The equivalence results between a convex and a concave transport cost are reexamined by assuming an arbitrary length. In contrast to previous research the solution found shows that the equivalence relationship depends on the space...

This article depicts a location game in a circular market. The equivalence results between a convex and a concave transport cost are reexamined by assuming an arbitrary length. In contrast to previous research the solution found shows that the equivalence relationship depends on the space...

This study analyzes optimal zoning policy in a duopolistic spatial competition framework for both circular and linear spaces. A regulator is introduced in the third stage of the price-location game through a welfare function to model zoning preferences from firms and consumers. An equilibrium...

This study examines the influence of gender composition on corporate financial performance, measured by the Price-to-Earnings (P/E) ratio and Tobin's Q, considering both male and female directors. Using an econometric panel data analysis, a dual fixed effects model and the Generalized Method of...

Applying a mixed theoretical approach, this paper addresses the causal relationship between the presence of women on steering committees (SC) and in senior management positions and the firm's stock return, measured through the price-earnings ratio (P/E). To do so, we disaggregate the composition...

Under quadratic transportation costs, the existence of the sequential first-locate-thenprice equilibrium in spatial competition is well known in the literature. In this paper, we find that the equilibrium may fail to exist under certain restrictions with respect to the location of firms and...

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future, since inspections can be influenced by firms' past performance relative to other competitors in the...