I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a...

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage, and matching with trading networks (trades). Computational issues are paramount. I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of...

I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...

I prove that the joint distribution of random coefficients and additive errors is identified in a mulltinomial choice model. No restrictions are imposed on the support of the random coefficients and additive errors. The proof uses large support variation in choice-specific explanatory variables...

We explore the identification of nonseparable models without relying on the property that the model can be inverted in the econometric unobservables. In particular, we allow for infinite dimensional unobservables. In the context of a demand system, this allows each product to have multiple...