The extended rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare order introduced and axiomatized by Stéphane Zuber and Geir B. Asheim satisfies strong anonymity (J. Econ. Theory (2011)). We question the appropriateness of strong anonymity in the context of a countably infinite sequence of subsequent...

Consider the following nine rules for adjudicating conflicting claims: the proportional, constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, Talmud, Piniles', constrained egalitarian, adjusted proportional, random arrival, and minimal overlap rules. For each pair of rules in this list, we...

We study divisor methods, the primary class to solve apportionment problems, based upon Stolarsky means S(alphabeta). These encompass the five traditional methods. We disclose a one-to-one relation between methods of the form S(alpha1) and aggregate measures of seat/vote disproportionality of...

Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011) refers to the optimal signalling of a Sender with informational advantage over the Receiver, under the constraint that the expected posterior (over the state space) equals the common prior. In the basic example of a judicial system with a...

For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive...

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

We characterize a new quasi-ordering on the collection of opportunity (or choice) sets. This new rule combines two criteria: the individual preferences on the universal set of options and the number of maximal options in the opportunity set. This new rule is compared with the indirect utility...