We investigate the effect of stock discovery on the profits of non-identical oligopolists. We show that a uniform addition to all stocks could harm firms that are originally larger than average. One conclusion that could be drawn from the results is that a new technology that leads to more...

We consider a benchmark static incentive scheme, i.e. a per unit subsidy, that induces a monopoly to produce a target output level. We show that the same output level can be achieved by a continuum of dynamic subsidy rules based on a performance indicator. The subsidy rules require only local...

We show that OPEC's market power contributes to climate change by enabling producers of relatively expensive and dirty oil to start producing before OPEC reserves are depleted. We examine the importance of this extraction sequence effect by calibrating and simulating a cartel-fringe model of the...

We show that OPEC's market power contributes to global warming by enabling producers of relatively expensive and dirty oil to start producing before OPEC reserves are depleted. We fully characterize the equilibrium of a cartel-fringe model and use a calibration to examine the importance of this...

We give a full characterization of the open-loop Nash equilibrium of a non-renewable resource asymmetric game. We show that (i) there almost always exists a phase where both supply simultaneously positive quantities, (ii) when the high cost mine is exploited by a number of firms that goes to...

We revisit the seminal growth model with exhaustible resources, the so called Dasgupta-Heal-Stiglitz-Solow model (DHSS). For this optimal control problem with two state variables, we explicitly characterize the dynamics of all the variables in the model and from all possible initial values of...

We specify and solve a closed-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game, with a price-taking fringe. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop dominant firm nonrenewable resource game (à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes...

We provide the closed form solution to the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (DHSS) model. The DHSS model is based on the seminal articles Dasgupta and Heal (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974), Solow (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974) and Stiglitz (Rev. Econ. Stud.,1974) and describes an economy with two assets, man-made...

We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game à la Salant 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number...

Inspired by empirical evidence from the oil market, we build a model of an oligopoly facing a fringe as well as competition from renewable resources. We explore different subclasses of HARA utility functions (Cobb-Douglas, power and quadratic utility) to check the robustness of results found in...