In this paper we show how imperfect memory can imply a preference for increasing payments. We model an agent making a decision regarding effort in two periods where the cost of effort is imperfectly known. Before making the first decision, the agent receives a signal related to the cost of...

We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and players' identification in social groups. We present evidence that the strategic nature of the game affects...

Standard random utility models can account for stochastic choice. However, a common implication is that the realized utilities are equal with probability zero. This knife-edge aspect implies that indifference is thin because arbitrarily small changes in utility will break indifference....

We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of feedback. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and players' identification in social groups. We present evidence that the strategic nature of the game affects...

This paper presents evidence which challenges the view that techniques which are designed to measure the social preferences of subjects can always be accomplished in a nonintrusive manner. We find evidence that such measurements can influence the preferences which they are designed to measure....

We model a game similar to the interaction between an academic advisor and advisee. Like the classic cheap talk setup, an informed player sends information to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both sender and receiver. However, unlike the classic cheap...

We interpret the social identity literature and examine its economic implications. We model a population of agents from two exogenous and well defined social groups. Agents are randomly matched to play a reduced form bargaining game. We show that this struggle for resources drives a conflict...

We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and identification in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma...

We test the assumption that social preferences are unchanged throughout a one-shot strategic game. To do so, we study the relationship between the strategic nature of a game and identification in social groups. In our experiment, the subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma...

Using a Two-Stage Least Squares procedure, we estimate the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and police spending using a cross-section of United States counties. Our results show that, when controlling for community characteristics and accounting for simultaneity bias, ethnic...