We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. This leads to a reassessment of the potential benefits of research cooperative agreements. Indeed, cooperation in...

We show that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated R&D and competition is not fundamental, but hinges on the nature of R&D spillovers. As a consequence, R&D subsidies may be more effective than previously thought.

The Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) introduced by Anderson and Neary (1994) provided the first theoretically satisfying measure of a country's tariff structure by overcoming the problem of ad hoc specification of indexing weights and the related index number problem. We observe, however, that...

We show that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated R&D and competition is not fundamental, but hinges on the nature of R&D spillovers. As a consequence, R&D subsidies may be more effective than previously thought.

We show that the presumed incompatibility of uncoordinated R&D and competition is not fundamental, but hinges on the nature of R&D spillovers. As a consequence, R&D subsidies may be more effective than previously thought.

We investigate a simultaneous discrete public good provision game with incomplete information. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider both contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed, while in the...

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed in the recent evolutionary literature to a class of coordination games played simultaneously by the entire population. In these games, payoffs whence best replies are determined by a summary statistic of the population strategy profile. We...

We show that the presumed incompatibility of R&D and competition in Spence (1984) is not fundamental, but hinges on a critical modeling choice. Specifically, we show that for a widely used class of R&D technology, that is, the functional form mapping R&D effort into cost reduction, the...

We characterize asymmetric equilibria in two-stage process innovation games and show that they are prevalent in the different models of R&D technology considered in the literature. Indeed, cooperation in R&D may be accompanied by high concentration in the product market. We show that while such...