This paper reports the results of an experiment on information spillovers between groups. We find that a player who is a member of multiple groups aggregates infor- mation and serves as a conduit through which information from one group spills over to another. We also find that such players are...

Economic partners – like masters and apprentices – produce benefits for each other. Yet, they are often subject to contracting limitations that restrict their actions, and thus the benefits they produce and receive. We characterize the relationship between (contracting) limitations and...

This paper reports the results of an experiment on information spillovers between groups. We find that a player who is a member of multiple groups aggregates information and serves as a conduit through which information from one group spills over to another. We also find that such players are...

We develop a finite random assignment model where players know either their cardinal or their ordinal preferences and may make cardinal or ordinal reports to an assignment mechanism. Under truthful reporting, we find that all mechanisms that disregard the cardinal information in players' reports...

In classic matching games, individuals choose their partners and each pair chooses a contract from a finite set of feasible contracts; the existence of stable allocations then follows from the (generalized) Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We consider an extension where the contract set is a...

Randomized response survey methods use noise to mask respondents’ answers to stigmatizing questions. Respondents weigh the preference for honesty against the disu- tility of stigmatization when deciding how to answer. Since the disutility of stigmati- zation depends on the degree of noise, the...