This article considers measures of individual welfare change for projects that change the state distribution of prices and incomes. For a consumer whose preferences satisfy the expected utility hypothesis, we investigate whether there is an increasing function of the state-contingent...

Sen?s social-evaluation-functional framework is used to reformulate Harsanyi?s social aggregation problem so that both single-profile and multi-profile issues can be considered with allowance made for different assumptions concerning the measurability and comparability of individual utilities....

This article establishes versions of Moulin's (Public Choice 35:437-455, 1980) characterizations of various classes of strategy-proof social choice functions when the domain consists of all profiles of single-peaked preferences on an arbitrary subset of the real line. Two results are established...

Tax competition between two governments who choose nonlinear income tax schedules to maximize the average utility of its residents when skills are unobservable and labor is perfectly mobile is examined. We show that there are no Nash equilibria in which there is a skill type that pays positive...

For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict...

A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a cadidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica,2001) have established a number of theorems which demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable...