Previous empirical studies that decompose the bid-ask spread were done when securities traded in discrete price points equal to one-sixteenth or one-eighth of a dollar. These studies concluded that inventory and adverse-selection costs were economically insignificant compared to order-processing...

We examine how an exogenous improvement in market efficiency, which allows the stock market to obtain more precise information about the firm's intrinsic value, affects the shareholder-manager contracting problem, managerial incentives, and shareholder value. A key assumption in the model is...

We show that put warrant issues can be used to signal a firm's superior prospects to a market that is not aware of them. One benefit of using put warrants to signal, particularly for growth firms, is that a firm receives cash when sending the signal, instead of paying out cash. We establish...

We show that put warrants can reduce financing costs when managers know more about the firm's future prospects than do outside investors. Put warrants are shown to be an efficient security in eliminating adverse selection costs in that firms can credibly reveal favorable private information...

In this paper, we investigate whether U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) with strong and independent risk management functions had lower aggregate risk and downside risk. We hand-collect information on the organization structure of the 75 largest publicly-listed BHCs, and use this information to...

We use a unique feature of California's property tax system to empirically identify the effect of selling homeowners' past property tax payments on their choice of listing price. Although past property taxes are sunk costs, we find that they have a significant positive effect on the sellers'...

In a dynamic model of originate-to-distribute lending, we examine whether reputation concerns can incentivize a bank to monitor loans it has sold. Investors believe that banks with fewer recent loan defaults are more likely to monitor ("have higher reputation''). In equilibrium, banks monitor...

We document substantial variation across startups in whether and when they appoint outside directors, and the type of directors they appoint. The startup-director match depends on professional connections and individual experience profiles. Early-stage investors are more likely to serve as...

How does insider ownership affect shareholder value? We answer this question by examining how the marginal valuation of new investment projects announced by Indian firms varies with the level of insider holding in the firm, and other firm and project characteristics. We find that among projects...

In this paper, we investigate whether U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) with strong and independent risk management functions have lower enterprise-wide risk. We hand-collect information on the organizational structure of the risk management function at the 74 largest publicly-listed BHCs, and...