We show that a simple generalisation of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962) yields outcomes for a generalised marriage problem, which are necessarily stable. We also show that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto Optimal for Men, i.e....

We show that, given two matchings for a room-mates problem of which say the second is stable, and given a non-empty subset of agents S if (a) no agent in S prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no agent in S and his room-mate in S under the second matching prefer each other to their...

We show that, given two matchings of which say the second is stable, if (a) no firm prefers the first matching to the second, and (b) no firm and the worker it is paired with under the second matching prefer each other to their respective assignments in the first matching, then no worker prefers...

In this paper we show that if the Pareto relation is acyclic then the set of all Pareto optimal social states coincides with chosen social states of acyclic Paretian social welfare relations. Subsequently we show that given an acyclic Paretian social welfare relations the set of all social...

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result of this paper states that every contract choice...