This paper examines the interaction between an analyst's disclosure and a manager's earnings report. We show how the nature of the analyst's information affects the quality of reported earnings. We also provide conditions for the analyst's disclosure to reduce the quality of investor information...

We examine how the threat of litigation affects an entrepreneur's reporting behavior when the entrepreneur (i) can misrepresent his privately observed information, (ii) pays legal damages out of his own pocket, and (iii) is optimistic about the firm's prospects relative to investors. We find...

We examine how the threat of litigation affects an entrepreneur's reporting behavior when the entrepreneur (i) can misrepresent his privately observed information, (ii) pays legal damages out of his own pocket, and (iii) is optimistic about the firm's prospects relative to investors. We find...

This paper examines the measurement of non-financial assets in imperfectly competitive markets and considers the effect of alternative measurements on firms' investing and operating activities. We analyze a duopoly where each firm manufactures, reports, and thereafter sells its inventory. We...

Using U.S.-based multinational firm data gathered over more than two decades, we examine factors associated with the location of decision-rights within these firms, whether the inappropriate assignment of decision-rights is associated with poor firm performance, and whether these firms relocate...

We study the determinants of auditor industry specialization, the impact of specialization on fees and audit quality, and a regulator's optimal choice of audit standards in the presence of specialization. In industries with correlated firm values, a specialist auditor enjoys synergies from...

We examine how the market's ability to assess the truthfulness of management earnings forecasts affects the extent to which managers bias their forecasts, and we evaluate whether the market's response to management forecasts is consistent with it identifying the predictable bias in forecasts. We...

We examine a firm's corporate governance choices within a competitive environment. A firm can choose a passive board that delegates decision rights to the executive manager, or an active board that retains these rights. We characterize the equilibrium governance choices and find that there...

This paper examines whether issuing management earnings guidance motivates a firm to raise its level of performance. The failure of management to attain a forecast may reflect poorly on its industry understanding, knowledge of the firm, and management capability. Accordingly, we hypothesize and...