We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and...

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and...

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and...

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and...

Baïou y Balinski (2002) generalizaron el modelo de asignación empresas-trabajadores a uno donde se planifica la asignación determinando además de la asignación de los trabajadores a las empresas cuánto tiempo los trabajadores le dedicarán a la empresa. Una planificación es estable si...

In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative game. There is a player, the innovator, having a know how or relevant information which is not useful for himself but it can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information are involved in a market...