We study a model in which an inventor discloses knowledge about its innovation and then a rival chooses the probability of attaining a competing invention. Disclosures, by creating prior art, diminish the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent for its invention (legal externality),...

We study technology adoption in a dynamic model of price competition. Adoption involves disruption costs and learning by doing. Because of disruption costs, the adopting firm begins in a market disadvantage, which may persist if its rival captures the buyers it needs to learn the technology. The...

We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may `enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting...

We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may 'enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting...

We examine the appropriability problem of an inventor who brings to the market a successful innovation that can be legally copied. We study this problem in a dynamic model in which imitators can “enter” the market either by copying the invention at a cost or by buying knowledge (a license)...

We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may `enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting...