Showing 1 - 10 of 413
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10001692253
Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014144998
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012621333
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012627362
Domains of individual preferences for which the well-known impossibility Theorems of Gibbard-Satterthwaite and Muller-Satterthwaite do not hold are studied. First, we introduce necessary and sufficient conditions for a domain to admit non-dictatorial, Pareto efficient and either strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010316073
We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010317111
Matchings in a market may have varying degrees of compromise from efficiency, fairness, and or stability. A distance function allows to quantify such concepts or the (dis)similarity between any two matchings. There are a few attempts to propose such functions, however these are tailored for...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014537003
This paper constructs a normative framework to quantify the difference (distance) between outcomes of market mechanisms in matching markets. We investigate the "cost of transformation" from one market mechanism to another, based on the differences in the outputs of these mechanisms, i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012270853
In this paper, we study the measurement of polarization in collective decision making problems with ordinal preferences over alternatives. We argue that polarization can be measured as an aggregation of antagonisms over pairs of alternatives in the society. We propose a measure of this sort and...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010899609
A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005752798