A common approach in modeling negotiations is to apply game theory to single issues. Recent work has suggested that the complexity of international negotiations can be better modeled by linking independent games. Successful linking is possible when the linked issues have compensating asymmetry...

Optimale internationale Schuldenaufnahme Kapitalallokation und Kreditwürdigkeitskontrolle In diesem Beitrag wird ein Zweisektorenmodell einer wachsenden Wirtschaft einschließlich des Verhältnisses zwischen der Kapazität des Schuldendienstes und den Kreditbedingungen eines Landes entwickelt....

This paper presents one of the first systematic treatments of economic incentives in the management of academic research and major inefficiencies in common funding mechanisms. Building on well-known but unusual attributes of research whereby the research payoff is only the “"best”" of...

A model with proportional errors in variables arising naturally in microeconomics is considered. Unlike the classical additive errors case, all OLS parameter estimates exhibit attenuation bias that does not depend on the limiting distribution of the data. The distribution of OLS estimators is...

Failure of integrability is shown to cause path-dependence of willingness-to-pay measures of welfare change. Using the linear expenditure system, effects of failure of integrability are negligible (substantial) for estimating income (price) elasticities. For single price changes, Hausman's...